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Abstract 
 
 
Scholars have extensively discussed the topic of “online radicalization,” often seeking to 
understand the form and function of online extremist material. However, this work has neglected 
to examine the role that the Internet plays alongside individual personality factors in the process 
through which someone develops violent extremist cognitions. This paper aims to extend the 
understanding of the role of personality differences in the effect of exposure to extremist material 
online. In this study, we experimentally measure the short-term psychological consequences of 
exposure to extremist material on extremist cognitions. We use a between-group experimental 
design in which participants are shown extremist propaganda with either pre- or post-counter 
messages. Our results indicate that trait personality, and specifically aggression, may be more 
influential than exposure to extremist propaganda in influencing extremist cognitions. We 
discuss the implications of these results in the context of future research directions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Is extreme in the eye of the beholder? An experimental assessment of extremist cognitions. 
 
 
Researchers are increasingly attempting to understand the role and effect of online 
 
extremist material within the radicalization process
1
 (Weimann, 2004), in which an individual’s 
 
or groups’ strained intercommunity relations may lead one to adopt confrontational or violent 
 
behaviors in lieu of dialogue practices (Schmid, 2013); the radicalization process includes both 
 
the adoption of extremist thoughts, as well as engagement in extremist behavior.  For example, 
 
Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai (2017, p.4) proposed that (1) the influence of online 
 
interactions and propaganda on the processes of radicalization remains a highly contested 
 
subject; (2) the consensus is that the Internet is a facilitator and catalyzer of an individual’s 
 
trajectory towards violent political acts; and (3) empirical evidence to draw convincing 
 
conclusions remains scarce, and this has negatively impacted on the strength of research on this 
 
topic. 
 
While much has been written on the topic of “online radicalization” (e.g., Bowman- 
 
Grieve, 2009; Bowman-Grieve & Conway, 2012; Conway, 2006; Ekman, 2014; Freiburger & 
 
Crane, 2008; Gendron, 2017; Hoffman, 2006; Holbrook, Ramsay, & Taylor, 2013; Mair, 2017; 
 
Rudner, 2017; Von Behr, Reding, Edwards & Bribbon, 2013; Weimann, 2011), what is lacking 
 
is: (a) empirical data to support any assertions of the role of extremist online material and (b) the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Radicalization is defined as an individual or collective process that emerges from the friction of 
intercommunity relations and is associated with a situation of socio-political polarization, where 
the practices of dialogue between different groups are abandoned in favor of an escalation of 
confrontational and violent tactics (Schmid, 2013). Though, it is important to clarify that there is 
a distinction between the adoption of extremist thoughts (i.e., radicalization) and engaging in 
extremist actions (i.e., engagement in terrorism; see Horgan, 2014). Similarly, extremism may 
be defined as ideological position adopted by anti-establishment movements that glorifies 
violent behavior as a “conflict resolution mechanism” (Bötticher, 2017, p. 74). 
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consideration (or measurement) of individual personality factors that may influence the effect 
of exposure to extremist online material. 
 
Given this, we adopt a novel (though not unprecedented; see Hassan et al., 2018; Shortland 
et al., 2017) experimental design aimed at investigating the effect of exposure to online extremist 
material on extremist cognitions, while accounting for the role of personality traits. Extremist 
cognition here is operationalized as militant (i.e., violent) extremist mindset, or being “prepared to 
accept, strongly support, or even advocate the use of violent means to achieve sociopolitical goals” 
(Stankov, Higgins, Saucier, & Knežević, 2010a, p. 246). In this study, we examine the effects of 
exposure to online extremist material on extremist cognitions using the Militant Extremist Mindset 
questionnaire (MEM, Stankov, Saucier, & Knežević, 2010b; Stankov et al., 2010a), while 
accounting for the influences of trait empathy, aggression, and hostility. In so doing, we aim to 
identify the psychological consequences of exposure to extremist material online and, thus inform 
the directions that counter-extremist messages should take. 
Extremist Material Online 
 
Beyond outlining the type of material that can be engaged with online and how 
individuals and networks engage with it (Caiani & Wagemann, 2009; Klausen, 2015), little 
research has focused on the role that the Internet plays in the process through which someone 
supports violent extremist activity. Research focused on online violent extremist propaganda is 
typically concentrated on explaining the form and function of such material (cf., Wojcieszak, 
2009, 2010; Reeve, 2019). As such, it does not seek to answer the more complicated questions 
about what interacting with such material does at the individual level, and specifically how 
this may amplify, or attenuate, the process of developing extremist cognitions. 
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One explanation for the Internet’s role is that it offers affordances to the individual, 
which facilitates their support for violent extremist behavior. Traditionally, an affordance is what 
the environment offers to the individual, for better or worse (see Gibson, 1977; Chemero, 2010). 
Hence, cognition and behavior are the result of a dyadic exchange between the individual and 
what the environment affords to them. As Ramsey (2011) highlights, affordances are “a useful 
way of bridging the gap between the semantic properties of content, and the material (or 
virtually material) conditions of its consumption” (p. 52). For example, scholars have argued that 
the qualities of the Internet invite people into a process that results in the collection of illicit 
images of children (Taylor & Quayle, 2008). Although a full discussion of the role of 
affordances in extremist behavior is available elsewhere (see Taylor & Currie, 2012), the overall 
view is that the presence of online extremist material, coupled with the nature of the Internet, 
invites individuals (or affords them the opportunity) to engage in a process that can facilitate a 
wider “radicalization” towards extremist violence. 
 
While the internet is not a sole generator of extremist cognitions, it may facilitate an 
individual’s trajectory towards supporting and/or engaging in socio-politically motivated violence 
(Meleagrou-Hitchens & Kaderbhai, 2017). Therefore, the Internet has altered the means by which 
radicalization occurs, but not the basic psychological process of radicalization (see Gill et al., 2015). 
What is missing, consequently, is not a re-conceptualization (i.e., creation) of a theory of “online 
radicalization,” but a baseline understanding of the ways that online extremist content plays in the 
development of extremist cognitions (Edwards & Gribbon, 2013). 
Personality & Extremist Cognitions 
 
While the Internet may invite people into the process, not all individuals exposed to 
extremist material online develop extremist cognitions. There are qualities inherent in the 
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individual that will interact with these affordances, resulting in individual differences in the 
outcome of exposure to such material. Therefore, what the Internet affords the individual is 
based upon qualities of that individual (see Model of Affordances, Norman, 1988). To this end, 
research has extensively focused on the “risk factors” for involvement and, while the findings 
are complicated and mixed, such works have identified predominantly socio-demographic and 
behavioral factors associated with engagement in certain forms of radicalized behaviors and 
certain types of Internet use (Gill et al., 2015; Gill et al., 2017; Gill & Horgan, 2013; Horgan, 
Shortland, Abbasciano & Walsh, 2016; Horgan, Shortland & Abbasciano, 2018). 
 
Research on the effect of violent media writ large reinforces the importance of 
considering individual personality (e.g., Giumetti & Markey, 2007). For example, findings from 
research on violent video games have consistently associated them with antisocial cognitions 
(e.g., Anderson, 2004; Bushman & Anderson, 2002). Experimental research has also 
demonstrated that exposure to violent video games leads to an increase in aggressive cognitions 
(Giumetti & Markey, 2007). This relationship is typically theoretically explained by the general 
aggression model (GAM; Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Anderson & Ford, 1986; Bushman & 
Anderson, 2002), which posits that the association between exposure to aggressive stimuli and 
aggressive cognitions is moderated by an individual’s own baseline cognitions, affect, and 
arousal level. Thus, violent material may not equally affect all people; its effect may be 
amplified for those with higher baselines of aggression. 
 
One exploratory study adopted methods from previous research on the influence of 
violent media on aggressive cognitions to explore the effects of extremist propaganda
2
 on 
 
 
 
2 Propaganda is defined as any information, doctrines or special appeals that are disseminated 
to influence opinion, emotions, attitudes and behavior of a specified group to benefit the 
sponsor either directly or indirectly (NATO glossary of terms, p. 2–205). 
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aggressive cognitions. Using an ambiguous story stem task, the study found that exposure to 
violent extremist propaganda did not increase levels of exhibited aggression, but actually 
decreased it. Furthermore, those who had high levels of trait aggression were unaffected by the 
(apparent pro-social) effect of extremist propaganda (Shortland et al., 2017). This research, 
while in need of replication, emphasizes the importance of measuring the role of individual 
differences in personality when examining the interaction of the individual, extremist online 
material, and cognitions. 
 
Previous research on individual personalities and attitudes indicate that the presence of 
proviolent attitudes are linked to more frequent episodes of general violence (Markowitz & 
Felson, 1998; Polaschek, Collie, & Walkey, 2004). In addition, prior studies of militant extremist 
mindsets demonstrate that proviolent attitudes represent the belief that violence is a viable way 
to achieve personal and social goals (Stankov et al., 2010b). Future research, however, should 
expand on this avenue of work as the overlap of the risk factors for and the effect of violent 
media on general violence and extremist-related violence remains unclear (see Meloy & Gill, 
2016; Sarma, 2017). 
 
Individual personality differences play a role throughout the radicalization process, both 
during the initiation of extremist behavior and its maintenance. For example, highly impulsive 
individuals may be more prone to engage in extreme behavior to meet a temporarily dominant 
need, but it is unlikely that this behavior will be maintained for the long-term (Kruglanski et 
al., 2017). Likewise, low levels of self-control or conscientiousness may increase the likelihood 
of that initial engagement in extreme activities but are not likely to lead someone to maintain 
that behavior (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). 
 
Measuring Extremist Cognitions 
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One issue with the research above is that it has neglected to measure extremist cognitions, 
focusing instead on general aggressive cognitions. The distinction between general violent or 
aggressive cognitions and extremist cognitions is important to highlight, as extremist cognitions 
focus on socio-political goals through the (potential) use of violence. The Militant Extremist Mindset 
(MEM) scale allows for an operationalization specific to extremist cognitions. Here, a militant (i.e., 
violent) extremist mindset refers to the level of accepting, supporting, or advocating for violence to 
achieve sociopolitical goals (Stankov et al., 2010b). The psychological components of a mindset 
include “a pattern of beliefs, feelings, thoughts, and motivation that tends to be mobilized under 
facilitating conditions” (Stankov et al., 2010a, p. 70). 
 
The MEM Questionnaire is a 24-item scale (see Appendix A) with three subscale factors: 
Proviolence, Vile World, and Divine Power (see Stankov et al., 2010a for scale creation). Items are 
scored on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly and completely disagree) to 5 (strongly and 
completely agree). Generally, most people fall on the weaker side of the militant extremism 
continuum and do not consider violence as a necessary means of achieving their goals. Endorsing a 
higher level of militant extremist cognitions indicates that a person has a set of beliefs, feelings, and 
motivations associated with violent behaviors (Stankov, Knežević, Saucier, Radović, & 
Milovanović, 2018). The nobility of the cause overcomes moral codes that may prohibit violence, 
allowing for a proviolent attitude in the context of serving the greater good. 
 
The subscale factor Proviolence includes ten items, three of which are reverse-coded. 
Higher Likert scores on these items indicate general agreement, justification, and support for 
violence in the context of revenge or redemption. Next, Vile World includes six items. 
 
Agreement with these items indicates participants believe something is wrong with the world and 
view this as despicable. Finally, Divine Power includes eight items, three of which are reverse- 
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coded. Agreement with these items indicates participants believe in a divine power, heaven, and 
God (Stankov et al., 2010a; see Appendix A). 
 
Methodological issues remain prevalent in studying the “extremist” which, as a field, 
often lacks primary source data (Silke, 2003), experimental rigor (Horgan, 2014), and empirical 
data (Schuurman, 2018). Thus, we view it of the utmost importance that such scales are 
replicated to ensure they are correctly applied in future research. Understanding the degree of 
holding an “extremist mindset” can support our understanding of mechanisms that guide 
extremist behavior (Borum, 2017). 
 
Current Study 
 
The current paper presents an experimental test of the short-term psychological 
consequences of exposure to extremist material on extremist cognitions via the MEM scale. 
Given that extremist violence is viewed as both pro-social (i.e., “altruistic violence”; see 
Pedahzur, Perliger & Weinberg, 2003) and anti-social, we consider on the role of trait-level 
empathy, aggression, and hostility (measures also used in previous research, see Shortland et 
al., 2017). 
 
Specifically, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Exposure to counter-messages alongside extremist content online will decrease 
an individual’s level of extremist cognitions. 
 
H2: The effect of exposure to extremist content online will be moderated by the 
personality factors, and specifically: 
 
H2a: Those high in trait empathy will have a lower score on the extremist mindset 
scale post exposure to extremist material online than those with low empathy. 
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H2b: Those high in trait aggression will have a higher score on the extremist mindset 
scale post exposure to extremist material online than those with low aggression. 
 
H2c: Those high in trait hostility will have a higher score on the extremist mindset 
scale post exposure to extremist material online than those with low hostility. 
 
Sample 
 
1,112 participants were recruited via Qualtrics Survey Software and collected as part of 
wider psychological studies on human behavior (see Table 1 for demographic data). Of the total 
sample, 251 participants were 18-20 (22.57%), 465 were 21-23 (41.82%), and 396 were 24-26 
(35.61%)
3
. Most participants were male (N=917; 82.46%), White (N=645; 58.00%), and had a 
religious affiliation of Christian (N=601; 54.05%). All participants were from the United States. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Pre-Test Questionnaire Completion 
 
Participants were asked to complete three personality questionnaires prior to study 
participation and potential exposure to extremist content. These questionnaires measure the 
participants’ baseline levels of empathy, aggression, and hostility. Descriptive statistics for these 
questionnaires can be found in Table 2. 
 
Empathy Questionnaire: Participant empathy was measured using the Toronto Empathy 
Questionnaire (TEQ), a 16-item measure including 8 items that are reverse-coded (Spreng, 
McKinnon, Mar, & Levine, 2009). Participants rate how frequently they act or feel in regard to 
each item using a 5-point scale with responses ranging from Never to Always. The TEQ includes 
items such as “I get a strong urge to help when I see someone who is upset” and reverse-coded 
 
 
 
3 Participants in this age range were specifically targeted in this study as this age group 
represents those at a potentially greater risk of radicalization (see Klausen, 2016; Gill et al., 
2014).
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items such as “I am not really interested in how other people feel”. Participant scores on the 
TEQ ranged from 21 to 80, with an average score of 57.40 (SD = 9.32). The items on this scale 
had a high internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha equaling .840. 
 
Aggression Questionnaire: Participant aggression was measured using the Buss & Perry 
Aggression Questionnaire (AQ), a 29-item measure including 2 items that are reverse-coded 
(Buss & Perry, 1992). Participants rate how items describe them on a 5-point scale from 
Extremely uncharacteristic of me to Extremely characteristic of me. The AQ includes items such 
as “Once in a while, I can’t control the urge to strike another person” and reverse-coded items 
such as “I can think of no good reason for ever hitting a person”. Participant scores on the AQ 
ranged from 31 to 197, with an average score of 105.82 (SD = 33.32). The items on the AQ had 
a high internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha equaling .943. 
 
Hostility Questionnaire: Participant hostility was measured using the State Hostility Scale 
(SHS), a 35-item measure including 11 items that are reverse-coded (Anderson, Deuser, & 
DeNeve, 1995). Participants rate their agreement to mood statements on a 5-point scale from 
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. The SHS includes mood statements such as “I feel like I’m 
about to explode” and reverse-coded items such as “I feel tame.” Participant scores on the SHS 
ranged from 35 to 175, with an average score of 87.26 (SD = 24.38). The items on the SHS had a 
high internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha equaling .938. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Study Condition 
 
In order to experimentally measure the short-term psychological consequences of online 
exposure to extremist content on extremist cognitions, we employ a between-group experimental 
design in which participants are shown extremist propaganda with either pre- or post-counter 
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messages. Participants were randomly assigned to one of several study conditions: control (no 
propaganda video shown), propaganda video with no counter message, propaganda with a 
counter message pre-video, and propaganda with a counter message post-video. Within the 
conditions with counter messages, three types of counter messages were utilized: Emotion, 
Religion, and Threat (see Table 2). In total, there were eight study conditions (control, 
propaganda only, counter-message (x3) pre, counter-message (x4) post). 
 
In this study, counter-messages were composed of a single page narrative that outlined 
the issues of extremism and the costs engaging in extremist behavior. The counter-message text 
was then accompanied by an image that showed either (a) an emotional scene of the damage 
caused to the civilian population by extremist behavior (emotion condition), (b) a poster 
showing the religious leader denouncing the ideology of the extremist group (religious 
condition), or (c) an image showing the potential consequences of joining an extremist group 
(death and/or arrest, threat condition). This was done to assess the strength of the propaganda 
message effect and assess if exposure to counter-messages had an inoculation effect similar to 
research on exposure to other types of media (e.g., Chaffee, Saphir, Graf, Sandvig, & Hahn, 
2001; Ivanov, Sellnow, Getchell, & Burns, 2018; Saleem, Prot, Anderson, & Lemieux, 2017). 
 
In six of these conditions, participants viewed an ISIS propaganda video (i.e., extremist 
online content) of a known ISIS fighter, John Maguire, who spoke about ISIS’s goals to 
facilitate lone wolf attacks in Canada. The video, which lasted 6 minutes and 13 seconds, was 
also shown (in full or in parts) on several Western media outlets, and the version in this study 
included acts that implied violence (i.e., firing weapons) but did not show any direct violence 
against humans (i.e., beheadings, killings, battlefield footage, etc.). 
 
Post-Measure Assessment 
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Extremist Cognitions: Participant extremist mindset was measured using the Militant 
Extremist Mind-set (MEM) Questionnaire (Stankov et al., 2010a; see Appendix A). Participant 
scores on our MEM scale ranged from 30 to 104, with an average of 65.68 (SD = 13.11; see 
Table 2). The items on our MEM scale had a high internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha 
equaling 0.81. 
 
Analysis 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were performed on the outcome of MEM 
Questionnaire using the lm function in R (R Core Team, 2019). First, we examined the influence 
of the predictor variables for the study condition, personality measures (empathy, aggression, 
and hostility), and religious affiliation (see Table 3). Religious affiliation was included in our 
modeling with the reference category of No Religious Affiliation; this was used to account for 
how having a religious affiliation may affect extremist cognitions, as items on the MEM directly 
related to topics of religious beliefs. We then included interaction effects between each of the 
three personality measures and the study conditions (see Table 4). 
 
To address issues that may threaten our use of OLS regression, the diagnostics of the models 
were assessed globally using the gvlma function in R (Pena & Slate, 2019) and then individually. 
We made adjustments to our regression models in order to address these potential threats to OLS 
regression. First, the three personality measures (empathy, aggression, and hostility) and the 
outcome measure MEM were all Z-score standardized by mean-centering variables and dividing by 
their standard deviations in order to convert them to z-scores. It is important to note that this 
transformation changes the interpretation of our standardized regression coefficients, where a one-
standard-deviation sized change in an independent variable results in a change in the dependent 
variable equal to the standardized regression coefficient (see 
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Schroeder, Sjoquist, & Stephan, 2016). After this standardization, through a diagnostic 
assumption in R, one case was identified as an outlier that had an influence in changing the 
significance of predictor variables, with the inclusion of the case causing significance and 
its removal eliminating significance. 
 
Thus, we include two additional models that attempt to minimize threats to OLS 
regression assumptions. In one version, we present the OLS regression results with the one 
outlier case dropped from our dataset (see Table 3 Model 2 and Table 4 Model 5). It is important 
to note that dropping this case eliminates the statistical significance of one variable: propaganda 
condition with no counter-message. While dropping a case may not always be recommended (see 
Field et al., 2012 for further discussion), we offer the inclusion of this model in tandem with the 
other analyses of this paper. 
 
In the second version, we refit our original models with a robust linear regression 
conducted using the rlm function in the MASS package in R (Venables & Ripley, 2002), using 
an M-estimator and the Huber weight function (see Table 3 Model 3 and Table 4 Model 6). A 
robust linear regression allows for the model to be less sensitive to outliers by reducing the 
weight of their influence (see Fox, 1997; Li, 1985). 
 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
 
Results 
 
The results for the OLS regression model are displayed in Table 3 and Table 4. Several of 
the results remain consistent across all models presented here. The results of all models indicate 
that both baseline aggression and religious affiliation have a statistically significant influence on 
extremist cognitions. As scores on the aggression questionnaire increase, so does the score on the 
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extremist mindset questionnaire. Additionally, the results indicate that when compared to those 
who identify as non-religious, those who identify as Christian or Catholic have higher likelihood 
of higher extremist mindset scores. Also, those who identify as Agnostic or Atheist have a 
higher likelihood of lower extremist mindset scores. 
 
The measures for baseline empathy and hostility both had mixed results in regards to 
their influence on extremist cognitions. First, in all three models in Table 3, baseline empathy 
had a statistically significant influence on extremist cognitions. As the scores on the empathy 
questionnaire increase, so does the score on the extremist mindset questionnaire. This 
significance did not hold through to the models assessed in Table 4 that include the 
interaction between study condition and personality measures. 
 
For baseline hostility, all three models in Table 3 indicate that it had a statistically 
significant influence on extremist cognitions. As the scores on the hostility questionnaire 
increase, so does the score on the extremist mindset questionnaire. This significance does hold 
for two of the models in Table 4 that use traditional OLS regression (Table 4, Models 4 and 5). 
However, when robust linear regression is applied in Table 4 Model 6, baseline hostility loses its 
significant association with extremist mindset. 
 
Only one study condition, propaganda video with no counter-message, demonstrated 
statistical significance in our models, with those in this condition having lower scores on the 
extremist mindset questionnaire (see Table 3 Model 1 and Table 4 Model 4). This significance, 
however, was only present in the OLS models that may be threatened by outliers. When this was 
corrected by either dropping out the outlier case (Table 3 Model 2 and Table 4 Model 5) or by 
applying robust linear regression (Table 3 Model 3 and Table 4 Model 6), this study condition 
loses its significant association with extremist mindset. 
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Finally, only one interaction effect had statistical significance: hostility and propaganda 
video with a post-video threat counter-message (see Table 4). This finding remained 
consistently significant across all models tested in Table 4. 
 
Discussion 
 
Given the results, we did not find support for hypothesis 1. The short-term exposure here 
to extremist content online only had a statistically significant influence on extremist cognitions 
for the condition of the propaganda video with no counter-message in Table 3 Model 1 and Table 
4 Model 4. However, this finding is threatened by an outlier in the data and should be taken with 
caution, as our corrections in the additional models demonstrate that this statistical significance 
does not hold. 
 
We did find support for hypothesis 2 and hypotheses 2a-2c with mixed results. 
Specifically, Hypothesis 2b was supported by the results of all the models examined in this study. 
Trait aggression played a significant role in affecting extremist cognitions consistently across all 
three models, leading to increases in MEM score. Higher scores on the baseline measure of 
aggression were related to higher scores of extremist cognitions on the MEM scale. 
 
Additionally, we found mixed support for Hypotheses 2a and 2c. In the Model 
without any interactions presented in Table 3, we found that trait empathy played a 
significant role in extremist cognitions, with higher scores on the baseline measure of 
empathy being related to lower scores of extremist cognitions on the MEM scale. This 
finding, however, did not hold through to the models presented in Table 4 that included 
interaction effects between the personality measures and the study conditions. 
 
When examining trait hostility across all the models presented, we found that trait 
hostility played a significant role in extremist cognitions in five of our six models, with higher 
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scores on the baseline measure of hostility being related to higher scores of extremist 
cognitions on the MEM scale. In Table 4 Model 6, for our robust linear regression model, trait 
hostility loses its statistically significant relationship with the MEM scale. 
 
Finally, we only found significance for one interaction effect in this study between 
hostility and the propaganda video condition with a post-video threat counter message. This 
significance held through all models in Table 4, indicating that this study condition mitigated the 
effects of trait hostility on extremist cognitions. 
 
This research offers a preliminary investigation into the interaction of online extremist 
propaganda and personality. We do not purport that these findings explain the effects of 
propaganda in the wider realm of “radicalization,” but that they do provide insight into basic 
psychological questions surrounding the short-term cognitive effects of exposure to extremist 
message. From this perspective, this study is much closer to recent studies on the effects of 
media exposure on cognition (e.g., Saleem, et al., 2017) than to past work on understanding the 
role of Internet materials on the process of “radicalization” (e.g., Halverson & Way, 2012). This 
experimental study offers several interesting findings for future research, while also generating 
many questions around the over-arching statements that are often made about the psychological 
impact of exposure to extremist content and of exposure to counter messages. 
 
Overall, there was no consistent effect of the propaganda on extremist mindset. Thus, it is 
possible that the short-term effect of exposure to this material is minimal, at least when 
compared to the known short-term cognitive effects of exposure to stereotype-driven news 
media for example (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Kalkan, Layman, & 
Uslaner, 2009; Saleem & Anderson, 2013). Instead there was a far more pervasive effect of 
personality on the outcomes measured here. 
16 
 
We must as well acknowledge the potential that the manipulations themselves may be 
weak within the context of this study, and thus facilitate the results that they do not influence 
extremist cognitions. The lack of interactions with propaganda should be interpreted cautiously, 
and this lack of interaction does not in and of itself facilitate the significance of personality. 
Instead, our findings demonstrate that when these factors are compared within our sample, 
personality factors had a more influential role on extremist cognitions than exposure to the online 
extremist propaganda used. It is also important to note here that the influence of our online 
extremist propaganda may be limited by the level of “extreme” of the video shown to 
participants. For obvious reasons, we could not ethically ask participants to view content that 
included direct violence against humans. Within this context, our findings imply that the person 
is more important in determining extremist cognitions than the material they consume. 
 
Identifying the specific role of personality differences in the effect of exposure to online 
propaganda is important, but at the same time, likely problematic. As a field of scholarly study, 
we have been overly focused identifying the “personality” of those who become involved in 
extremism; often, this involves a rather naive view of a “profile,” or a specific series of 
personality “risk factors” that will predict an extremist outcome. Such attempts have remained 
stagnant (for many reasons; see, for example, Gill & Corner, 2017). The results here support that 
the lack of progress in this field does not mean that we should abandon efforts and concentrate 
on just generic counter-extremist materials (Palasinski & Bowman-Grieve, 2017) that focus 
mainly on situational factors (Palasinski, Granat, Seol, & Bowman-Grieve, 2014). Instead, we 
might consider the design of counter-propaganda materials that may potentially benefit from 
tailoring their contents to individuals who have already been identified as being at the highest 
risk of problematic Internet use (thus also at the higher risk of encountering and getting affected 
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by extremist propaganda). In other words, in light of our results suggesting the importance of 
personality, we propose the need for examining how such new tailored contents tap into the 
cognitive and emotional needs of those who score high on the measures of loneliness, low self-
esteem, and depression, the key factors associated with problematic Internet use (Caplan, 2002). 
 
Future research might also employ more sophisticated designs aimed at examining the 
mid and long-term effects of exposure to extremist material on not just cognition, but also 
online and offline behavior, the former being easier to monitor. Such research might also 
consider combining our results with research on online addiction (Wang, Ho, Chang, & Tse, 
2015). This, for example, may involve a novel exploration of counter extremist contents that 
appeal to those who score high in neuroticism, low in conscientiousness (associated with 
Internet addiction) and those scoring high in extraversion and high in neuroticism (associated 
with social networking addiction – another extremist propaganda susceptibility risk factor). 
Further research should also commit to studies involving more nuanced measures of arousal, 
attention, and behavioral outcomes. 
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  N % 
Demographics   
Gender   
Male 917 82.46 
Female 195 17.54 
Age   
18-20 251 22.57 
21-23 465 41.82 
24-26 396 35.61 
Race/Ethnicity   
White 645 58.00 
Black or African American 128 11.51 
Hispanic/Latino 117 10.52 
Asian 190 17.09 
Other 32 2.88 
Religion   
Christian 601 54.05 
Catholic 110 9.89 
Atheist 75 6.74 
Agnostic 70 6.29 
Non-Religious 191 17.18 
Other 65 5.85  
 
Table 1: Sample Demographics (N=1,112) 
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 Min. Max. Mean St. Deviation 
Outcome Variables     
Extremist Score 30 104 65.68 13.11 
Personality Measures     
Empathy Score 21 80 57.40 9.32 
Aggression Score 31 197 105.82 33.32 
Hostility Score 35 175 87.26 24.38 
 N %   
Condition     
Control Group (No Propaganda 139 12.5   
Video or Counter-Message)     
Propaganda Video Only (No 139 12.5   
Counter-Message)     
Propaganda Video with Pre-Video     
Counter-Message:     
Emotion Counter-Message 139 12.5   
Religion Counter-Message 139 12.5   
Threat Counter-Message 139 12.5   
Propaganda Video with Post-     
Video Counter-Message:     
Emotion Counter-Message 139 12.5   
Religion Counter-Message 139 12.5   
Threat Counter-Message 139 12.5    
Table 2: Scale Descriptives and Study Conditions (N=1,112) 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
 OLS model With Dropped Robust Linear 
   Case  Regression 
 B (SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
    
Intercept 63.74 (1.16)*** 63.71 63.80 
   (1.15)*** (1.16)*** 
Religion (Ref = Non-Religious)       
Christian 5.51 (0.94)*** 5.53 (0.93)*** 5.78 (0.94)*** 
Catholic 3.23 (1.31)* 3.24 (1.30)* 3.04 (1.31)* 
Agnostic -6.96 (1.53)*** -6.95 -7.04 
   (1.52)*** (1.54)*** 
Atheist -5.38 (1.49)*** -5.36 (1.48) -5.25 
   ***  (1.50)*** 
Other 2.09 (1.57) 2.08 (1.56) 2.24 (1.58) 
Condition (Ref = No Propaganda Video)       
Propaganda Video, No CM -2.85 (1.36)* -2.51 (1.36) -2.19 (1.37) 
Propaganda Video, Pre-video Emotion CM -0.34 (1.31) -0.33 (1.30) -0.51 (1.32) 
Propaganda Video, Pre-video Religion CM -1.63 (1.31) -1.63 (1.30) -1.75 (1.32) 
Propaganda Video, Pre-video Threat CM -1.60 (1.31) -1.56 (1.30) -1.81 (1.32) 
Propaganda Video, Post-video Emotion CM 0.10 (1.32) 0.10 (1.31) -0.44 (1.33) 
Propaganda Video, Post-video Religion CM -0.42 (1.32) -0.43 (1.31) -0.45 (1.33) 
Propaganda Video, Post-video Threat CM 1.35 (1.33) 1.40 (1.32) 1.40 (1.34) 
Personality Pretest Measures       
Empathy
† 
-0.74 (0.37)* -0.86 (0.37)* -0.88 (0.38)* 
Aggression
† 
4.55 (0.43)*** 4.61 (0.43)*** 4.80 (0.43)*** 
Hostility
† 
1.85 (0.46)*** 1.83 (0.45)*** 2.04 (0.46)*** 
Adjusted R
2 
0.31  0.32      
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; CM = Counter-Message; †=standardized. 
 
Table 3: Regression Analysis for Extremist Cognitions on the Militant Extremist 
Mindset (MEM) Scale 
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 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
    
 OLS model With Dropped Robust Linear 
   Case  Regression 
 B (SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
    
Intercept 63.87 63.87 63.90 
 (1.17)*** (1.16)*** (1.16)*** 
Religion (Ref = Non-Religious)       
Christian 5.56 (0.94)*** 5.56 (0.94)*** 5.72 (0.93)*** 
Catholic 3.49 (1.30)** 3.49 (1.30)** 3.16 (1.29)* 
Agnostic -7.03 -7.03 -7.49 
 (1.53)*** (1.52)*** (1.51)*** 
Atheist -5.36 -5.36 -5.14 
 (1.48)*** (1.47)*** (1.46)*** 
Other 1.87 (1.58) 1.87 (1.56) 2.08 (1.56) 
Condition (Ref = No Propaganda Video)       
Propaganda Video, No CM -2.95 (1.38)* -2.64 (1.37) -2.14 (1.36) 
Propaganda Video, Pre-video Emotion CM -0.86 (1.36) -0.86 (1.34) -0.94 (1.34) 
Propaganda Video, Pre-video Religion CM -1.82 (1.35) -1.82 (1.34) -1.85 (1.34) 
Propaganda Video, Pre-video Threat CM -2.36 (1.34) -2.36 (1.33) -2.44 (1.33) 
Propaganda Video, Post-video Emotion CM 0.17 (1.40) 0.17 (1.39) -0.41 (1.38) 
Propaganda Video, Post-video Religion CM -0.88 (1.36) -0.88 (1.35) -0.93 (1.34) 
Propaganda Video, Post-video Threat CM 1.39 (1.37) 1.39 (1.36) 1.81 (1.36) 
Personality Pretest Measures       
Empathy
† 
-0.31 (1.26) -0.31 (1.25) -0.90 (1.25) 
Aggression
† 
4.63 (1.27)*** 0.63 (1.26)*** 4.69 (1.26)*** 
Hostility
† 
2.86 (1.41)* 2.86 (1.40)* 2.51 (1.40) 
Interactions       
Empathy
†
 & Video, No CM 1.37 (1.64) 0.51 (1.63) 2.20 (1.62) 
Empathy
†
 & Video, Pre-video Emotion CM -1.07 (1.69) -1.07 (1.68) -0.79 (1.67) 
Empathy
†
 & Video, Pre-video Religion CM -2.17 (1.66) -2.17 (1.65) -1.57 (1.64) 
Empathy
†
 & Video, Pre-video Threat CM -2.80 (1.64) -2.80 (1.58) -1.90 (1.58) 
Empathy
†
 & Video, Post-video Emotion 1.52 (1.72) 1.52 (1.71) 1.59 (1.70) 
CM       
Empathy
†
 & Video, Post-video Religion -0.22 (1.63) -0.22 (1.61) 0.32 (1.61) 
CM       
Empathy
†
 & Video, Post-video Threat CM 0.22 (1.59) 0.22 (1.57) 0.49 (1.57) 
      31 
Aggression
†
 & Video, No CM -0.95 (1.84) -0.17 (1.83) -0.31 (1.82) 
Aggression
†
 & Video, Pre-video Emotion 0.23 (1.72) 0.23 (1.70) 0.37 (1.70) 
CM    
Aggression
†
 & Video, Pre-video Religion 0.20 (1.74) 0.20 (1.73) 0.57 (1.72) 
CM    
Aggression
†
 & Video, Pre-video Threat CM 2.32 (1.86) 2.32 (1.84) 2.52 (1.84) 
Aggression
†
 & Video, Post-video Emotion 0.24 (1.78) 0.24 (1.76) 0.36 (1.76) 
CM    
Aggression
†
 & Video, Post-video Religion -2.83 (1.75) -2.83 (1.74) -3.24 (1.73) 
CM    
Aggression
†
 & Video, Post-video Threat 1.16 (1.69) 1.16 (1.67) 1.62 (1.67) 
CM    
Hostility
†
 & Video, No CM 2.34 (1.96) 1.95 (1.95) 3.10 (1.94) 
Hostility
†
 & Video, Pre-video Emotion CM -2.60 (1.96) 2.60 (1.94) -2.31 (1.93) 
Hostility
†
 & Video, Pre-video Religion CM -0.78 (1.89) -0.78 (1.87) -0.13 (1.86) 
Hostility
†
 & Video, Pre-video Threat CM -6.28 (1.96)** -6.29 (1.95)** -5.90 (1.94)** 
Hostility
†
 & Video, Post-video Emotion CM -0.16 (1.92) -0.16 (1.90) 0.52 (1.89) 
Hostility
†
 & Video, Post-video Religion CM 0.81 (1.92) 0.81 (1.90) 2.10 (1.90) 
Hostility
†
 & Video, Post-video Threat CM -2.27 (1.84) -2.27 (1.83) -2.16 (1.82) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.32 0.33 --   
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; CM = Counter-Message; †=standardized. 
 
Table 4: Regression Analysis for Extremist Cognitions on the Militant Extremist 
Mindset (MEM) Scale with Interaction Effects between Study Condition and Personality 
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